C-95. Behavioral roots of language

We are familiar with proper nouns, which name a particular entity, such as a person or a pet animal, and thereby providing identification for that entity. And we are familiar with common nouns, which name as one (e.g., via a concept) a group of particular entities, such as humans or dogs, and thereby providing as much identification for the entities as is implied by the attribute(s) on which the grouping is based (X).

But naming for identification is not all there is to realization (App. XIX) of what entities, qua behavioral entities, are all about. So the noun as a linguistic term has more left to do, something that is not proper and something that is not common – at least not common in quite the same sense as the common noun has it. There’s more to cognition than recognition. But recognition is pretty much all that proper nouns and common nouns offer.

Consider what a helpful preface (and complement) to a dictionary might say about a third kind of noun. Let’s call it an improper, uncommon noun: an I-U noun. The dictionary contains hundreds of them, but they are not marked as such – which is to also say that they are not theoretically explicated (C-85). These are words, behavioral terms like “mind” and “matter,” for which the naming tradition has crippled linguistic technological development. These are words that, first and foremost, represent needed functionality in consequence of the Nature of Things (App. XIX: C-88: Stage 1).These are words that would best serve us if we understood them to be that. But not only that. For each can also serve as a common noun (Stage 4) and in the two different verb usages (intransitive and transitive: Stages 2 & 3) … thereby representing each and all of the four stages of consequentiality.

These are words that have behavioral roots, not just linguistic roots. They need not be individually marked, such as the linguistic roots we assign for words in a dictionary (e.g., Latin, Greek, et al). Hence the need for a preface to a “new, improved”dictionary. Because they express all four stages of consequentiality, their meanings should override the verb-noun and transitive-intransitive verb distinctions of today’s dictionary. And most consequentially their free usage for any and all of the four stages should begin to wean the users of language toward a closer appreciation of the Nature of Things, to bring them closer to an accord with the Nature of Things, acting as a multi-faceted elicited criterion (VIII) in lieu of the cybernetic “Stop” that we do not possess … to prevent us from perpetuating our minding misadventures.

In dictionary terms, there is no reason that “mind,” “matter” et al should not have all four types of meaning. (But see C-88 for examples of contemporary incomplete representation.) These terms are eligible for use as verbs and/or as nouns. No need for fixes like “-en” prefixes or “-ment” suffixes. Most assuredly, no need for suffixes like “-ion,” “-ment,” and “-ity” which compress the stages.The words and stages should be fully realized. But not, of course, just for recognition. They, each and everyone, should tell us to go forward by strengthening our capabilities (V).

Languages, like statutes and other normative collations, are de facto theories of behavior. More positive, perhaps, than negative in mode of instruction. But still, so far, unsatisfactory – incomplete and inaccurate – as behavioral theories OF, ABOUT and (especially) FOR.

The path forward seems clear. Communication realization follows behavioral realization; behavioral realization follows (at least a beginning!) realization of the Nature of Things. The trail of human steps that we see, however, exhibits a picture of communication dysfunction and behavioral dysfunction.

Get the picture?

(c) 2013 R.F. Carter