C-132. R-path: a more material philosophy

First, let us set aside the concept of “materialism.” BFEPS is not about a purely substantive analysis, of conditions reducible – in some manner – to this or that substance. Nor is this about a predilection for, even an overwhelming possessive desire for, this or that object of attention … this because that sense of materialism puts a value on any or everything, even the particulars of Realization – “folding up the fan” on the R-transform (C-111), thereby abusing both Valuation and Realization, especially their potential if operating interdependently.

Materiality could hardly be more different from either sense of materialism. The first because materiality speaks to the consequentiality of steps made and taken, not seeing everything substantively as bodies. The second because it speaks to the consequentiality of consequentiality per se as a general persisting condition of the Nature of Things (III), not limiting us to an ahistorical explanation of us and our world (see CEM-history: App. XI, App. XVI; C-118), not turning its back on the problem solving challenge that comes to behavioral entities: Pioneers At and In the Frontier (C-118, C-119) given the Nature of Things.

Materiality is the stuff of the R-path of problem solving we should be taking, the strengthened capabilities, their exercise, the composed structures of bodies and steps which bring about needed functionality (App. XIX) for problem solving. The R-path is a becoming. (Think of “reality” as an incomplete Read of Realization and CEM-history.) Materialism on the other hand speaks to a self more concerned with identity, with knowing one’s self, as is, by possessions.

Matter and energy, qua substances, don’t solve problems. Materiality does (C-78). Materiality: the Realized aspects of matter and energy, as manifested in bodies and steps, partly via evolution but most consequentially via development (C-121). And evident in the collisions, especially those arranged, occasioned by multistep-taking bodies.

Collisions bring consequentiality home to us, and bring along the Nature of Things’ other general persisting conditions of partial order and behavioral entity discontinuity (III). Not just the fact of collisions and the fact of consequentiality become apparent, however. There are the (blithely called) “circumstances surrounding” collisions, the consequentiality conditions prior to and following on collisions, such as prior steps made and/or taken to arrange a collision -- or not taken to avoid a collision, such as step-making and/or taking capacity and/or capability enhanced or impaired by a collision.

These step conditions are in addition to body conditions prior to and following on a collision. Together they are the involved materiality. Materiality, we have seen (C-126, C-130), fills out our Sense of consequentiality, comprising both body and step consequentiality, and especially because today AT and In the Frontier of CEM-history it brings to the fore the consequentiality of body and step interdependency as a resource. And it does not consign step to a property of body (C-97), confounding and confusing the picture of consequentiality (C-114: What a muddle!), thereby limiting our Grasp of consequentiality.

Materiality gives us a theoretical picture of consequentiality that the conceptual “cause-effect” emphasis on entities (aka bodies) does not (C-29, C-85, C-124). We can objectify any condition to make it available for communication. But should we if this misses something of consequence? What if that objectified focal condition is a thick cross-sectional slice – i.e., analytic unit (C-130) – through CEM-history (e.g., the concept of “action”), with much of that history’s step-making and taking unapparent? (Will the physics, chemistry and biology of the brain fill out the picture of material consequentiality [C-116]?)

Are humans destined, like cross-sectioned tree trunks, to be little more than particular utilities (e.g., table tops; soldiers) and collected conversation pieces (e.g., petrified wood table tops; celebrities as stars) than they are to become Realized beings?


With multi-step behavioral entities, we get history as fact, challenging any purely ahistorical philosophy as a full accounting of consequentiality (C-111). And we get more of consequentiality: the materiality of step after step, and not just a simple addition of step consequentiality to body consequentiality, for there is the consequentiality of body and step interdependence, of problem-solving behavioral molecules – much of it still untapped.

Hence CEM-history (App. XI, App. XVI), in which contingent emergent materiality appears as a current in the stream of history. This CEM-history whose step materiality becomes greater, and greater at an increasing rate, with the coming and crossing of the biology threshold (C-105: Grasp and Involve), then into the realm of cognition, communication and composition (App. XVI diagram). We humans are where consequentiality is most evident (C-3, C-126) … if we can overcome the impediments of impoverished minding and its products (0:S-P,Ps).

We see today’s greater materiality manifested in the frequency and variety of contemporary collisions. These collisions may be arranged or not. Arranged collisions may be softer – or harder … but plentiful in any case.

What “causality” type concepts do is to arm us weakly with an inadequate minding functionality – i.e., Grasp. This is evident in the BPO bias (C-39), in which particulars, P, taken as focal entities, B, are Grasped by ahistorical concepts. What the theoretical CEM-history offers, with the help of the SGN correction (C-104, C-135) and the R-transform (C-111), is to talk about materiality – i.e., consequentiality – in a perspective more pertinent to where we are in CEM-history, At and IN the Frontier, where we need to be able to talk about collisions and steps to arrange them (C-128), where the R-Sense of consequentiality before the fact is at least as important there as what we know about consequentiality via particular consequences after the fact.

We can come to talk more productively (C-129), if we see and say better (Reads and Tells) what we are talking about – i.e., as theoretical constructs (C-85). And if we make the most of materiality in a Frontier philosophy.

(c) 2015 R.F. Carter