C-138. G-change and p-changes

When we think about consequentiality in terms of a change – i.e., a particular difference in that same particular thing over time: a p-change (III; C-4), our Grasp of consequentiality may be weak (C-101) in the absence of a consideration of change per se: of G-change … itself in consequence of the Nature of Things’ general persisting conditions of partial order and consequentiality (III).

Much is going on between the cross-sectional slices of history that such p-changes miss of consequentiality. (In theory, enough such slices might be expected to cover all of the missing change – and perhaps reveal the G-change. But that would require a complete and accurate architecture re consequentiality [C-11, C-90]. Our inability to solve problems [0] denies the imminent likelihood of that.)

When we focus our attention on a particular something over time, but viewing “change” cross-sectionally, we are treating “objectively” our focus of attention, whatever it may be. It can be a relationship or even a thingk (C-27). We utilize the cognitive technology of object-attribute plus the inside-outside relation (X). An attribute difference in the “object” over time constitutes a change … whether, for example, of position or possession.

We are at best sampling G-change after the fact with these biased units of observation – to the distress of behavior’s molecular materiality, with its potential for composing solutions for unsolved problems (II; C-9: Adept). Compositional potential, that is, if we alter our perspective to take a transverse sectioning view of behavior, not as this or that attribute of an object (C-97, C-114) but as that which is in consequence of the Nature of Things – i.e., the functionality necessitated by the Nature of Things’ general persisting conditions, GPC, of partial order and consequentiality in light of the collision potential thereby conferred on and for disparate entities (discontinuity: the third GPC).

This common view of change as a difference in the same particular thing over time leaves too much of consequentiality out. (This view can only see change as a universal condition attending particular entities [p-changes], and not as a different kind of generality [G-change] ... a general condition that makes our changing things, as an agent of change, a possibility too.) That common view would seem to be an extreme example of a crucial type of unsolved problem (0:S-P). We are afflicted here with a way of minding, a method for Grasping and Involving (VII, X; C-105), that has itself become a problem– one so serious that we should see it as a forbidding escarpment confronting human progress (C-56).

We can chart a path here. We started with a concern for particulars. (Sensible enough, given collisions to be avoided and/or arranged … by us as particulars with other particulars.) With the need to be able to identify them and/or their locations for steps to come. (To do what we could [then and there, or later] about and with them.) But what of that which we couldn’t do, but needed to be able to do – in a life still lacking in Realization (App. XIX; C-111), a life still lacking in quality (0: Quality of life) and beset with unsolved problems? We’ve made improvements via p-changes. But far from enough of them. And many p-changes have been dysfunctional, depressing our quality of life.

How are we to have a complete and accurate picture of behavior if we cannot overcome the gaps left from the BPO-biased (C-39) cross-sectioning linked to the cognitive technology of object-attribute, inside-outside relation (X: 0-A, I-O) – which is so much embodied in our discourse (any condition objectified, then assigned attributes)? So much so that we have a muddled view (C-114), seeing a behavioral entity rather than an R-entity (C-136), and a seriously weak Grasp Involve capability (C-105). So much so that we have need of a reinvented language (App. XI-XII; C-27, C-40, C-55, C-128, C-142) to help us amend our path.

The Realization vector, mapping the way from problem to solution, and the R-transform technology [C-111] can enable us to make the most of G-change and p-changes. ) We need to see “change” as an R-word, bringing both G-change and p-changes to bear on our needed functionality.


G-change is about the Nature of Things, however represented: such as metaphorically “fire,” topically as history per se (a fact and not just a story), processually as streaming consequentiality (every condition is IN and OF consequence [C-118]), or, as a constant (II: a general circumstance; C-139). G-change is the consequentiality per se in which we must engage … however we opt to engage via p-changes.

But, as noted above with respect to the particulars of collisions, our initial and still pervasive sense of change had and has much more to do with the things of nature than with the Nature of Things. (We have seen this with the needed distinction between concepts and theoretical constructs [C-85]. The former’s “p-“does not provide the greater Involve, for Grasping [and meaning] , that the latter’s “G-“ contribution makes.)

G-change introduces a developmental concern for the behavioral problem (I:Pbeh), seeing it independently of particular situational problems (I:Psits). The Pbeh persists (C-1, C-41, C-115): For a change agent, change per se must be effected before any particular change can be effected. (Turn on to tune in, so to speak. A contingency.)

This is the domain of the before-the-fact principles of Requisites and Imperatives (VI-XI). Where such features as quickness, integrity, balance, smoothness of performance, and spiritedness constitute an effectiveness that is fundamental to making p-changes.

Here then, for example, is where behavioral metastrategies of Adopt, Adapt and Adept must be considered (C-9). Do we follow in the footsteps of others? Or, do we, as best we can, parallel and not clash with the steps of others? Or, do we make new steps, so as to be able to take, steps of our own?

G-change is why we find the agenda of “observer: observed” re particulars flawed (C-54, C-61). It’s why we see “observing: observed” preferable (as focal attention’s contribution to minding), so that minding’s other work of cognition, communication and composition re the focus of attention comes into play (App. III). (This after we convert “mind” to an R-word [C-85, C-107], making a tertiary Read [C-8] of “mind” in step terms [minding moving] not just in body terms).

G-change is the story that brain mapping can never tell (C-116). Brain mapping can tell us about differences and about differences over time in the same thing (p-changes). But brain mapping does not tell us enough about change per se. Not enough about being OF consequence and not just IN consequence. G-change is the story that won’t be told as long as we settle for asking “Source?” questions about p-changes (C-139).


There is a kind of pseudo change (“something different”) that we should not mistake for G-change. It occurs if and when we consign ourselves to decision making (C-98: D.M./P=>S >1), abandoning Realization and a productive interdependency of decision making with problem solving. We then merely exchange one solution for another (e.g., vote for a “change,” “the grass is greener on the other side of the fence”) … a consumer path which, obstinately pursued over time and encouraged by proffered differences (e.g., marketing), can lead to an oscillatory effect with traumatic consequences (XI).

(This is the sort [!] of thing that happens when a concept affords only a weak Grasp of what is being talked about [C-124]… here failing to distinguish among the G-change constant, the category of p-changes and decision making’s pseudo-changes. Concepts like “development,” “growth,” and “history” are subject to the same confounding and confusion. Consequentiality and needed functionality demand more of us than concepts’ loose Grasp.)

(c) 2016 R. F. Carter